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ARTICLES
THE UBIQUITY OF THE BENEFIT
PRINCIPLE
RicHARD A. EPSTEIN*

I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE MIssiNG, PIECE OF THE PUZZLE

The standard first-year curriculum in an American law school
divides the private law materials into three main courses: property,
torts, and contracts. This organization is not simply an arbitrary
assemblage of categories, but reflects a powerful, if unarticulated,
view of the world. Property comes first, and its most distinctive portion develops the rules that assign the initial ownership, be it individual or collective, to persons, either singly or in common. The law of
tort in all of its ramifications is concerned with the protection of the
person and property from various forms of interference, most typically by force and fraud. Finally, the law of contract addresses the way
in which these entitlements to labor and property may be voluntarily
exchanged. Taken together, these basic building blocks of nature may
be combined into the complex financial and legal arrangements on
which all forms of business relationship depend.1
The scheme is not merely one of interest to common lawyers, but
also to philosophers as well. David Hume's A Treatise of Human
Nature specifies "three fundamental rules of nature, that of the stability ofpossession, of its transference by consent, and of the performance
*

James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.

This Article was prepared for the panel on restitution held at the American Association of Law
Schools Conference, in Orlando, Florida in January 1993.
1. For a summary of how the parts fit together, see RicHARD A. EPsTEIN, SIMPLE RuLEs
FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (forthcoming 1995).
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ofpromises."2 His list does not show a perfect correspondence to the
traditional categories of property, tort, and contract, but with only a
little tugging and hauling the basic parallels come through. The stability of possession involves both rules of acquisition and protection; the
rules of transfer of property and the keeping of promises appear to
cover the basic law of contracts, the former for the transfer of property and the latter for both that and the rendering of personal services.3 The same tripartite division finds echoes in more modem work.
Thus Robert Nozick's justly celebrated book Anarchy, State and Utopia4 argues that three distinct types of rules are necessary to offer a
complete account of justice in individual holdings and entitlements.
His rule of acquisition corresponds to the common law rule of first
possession; his rule of rectification corresponds to the tort law; and his
rule of exchange corresponds to the law of contract.
However attractive this basic scheme from a legal and philosophical perspective, it is sadly incomplete because it does not give any
explicit place to the law of restitution, or quasi-contract. This ancient
body of law had its first development in the Roman texts, 5 and was
introduced into the common law by Lord Mansfield in Moses v.
MacFerlan, under the familiar rubric of natural law, with an explicit
nod to its Roman sources.6 The subject continues to be of vast importance in the day-to-day operation of modem legal systems. During
the last part of the nineteenth century, with the treatises of first
2. DAVID HumE, A TIREATsE OF HumAN NATUR bk. III, § VI (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.,
1888).
3. Hume's scheme would have been clearer if he had noted that the transference of property is a subset of keeping promises, just as the law for conveyancing in the standard property
courses is a subspecies of contract. But while his classification is not perfect, his instincts are, as
ever, sound.
4.

ROBERT Nozic,, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).

5. See the explicit acknowledgement of the category in JUsTINIAN'S INsTrruTEs bk. III, tit.
13. The category of quasi-tort was also included but had no survival value. For a discussion, see
Max Radin, The Roman Law of Quasi-Contract,23 VA. L. REv. 241 (1937).
6. 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760). He describes the heads of liability as follows:
It lies for money paid by mistake; or upon a consideration which happens to fail; or for
money got through imposition, (express or implied); or extortion; or oppression; or an
undue advantage taken of the plaintiff's situation, contrary to the laws made for the
protection of persons under those circumstances. In one word, the gist of this kind of
action is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties
of natural justice and equity to refund the money.
Id. at 681. Note that this definition is in some sense too narrow because it only deals with cases
seeking the restoration of money paid over. It could well be that the money is sought for some
other reasons (goods consumed by mistake) or that specific relief (the recovery of a thing) is
demanded as well, but under the same principles set out by Lord Mansfield. Note too that the
monetary relief was a reflection of the common law limitations on the forms of damages, which
are far less important in modem systems that unify common law and equitable actions. For an
HeinOnline -- 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1370 1993-1994
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Keener and then Woodward,7 it assumed a fairly comprehensive form
that has survived, relatively unscathed, to the present day.8 At one
point restitution was a standard course in the upper-year curriculum,
but over time and with the ever greater expansion of public law subjects, it has slowly disappeared from view, being subsumed in a more
general course on remedies, or taught in the interstices of the basic
law of property, tort, and contract. But its ubiquity is a sign of its
theoretical importance. In this Article, I shall place the question,
What is the role of the restitution principle?, front and center, and
hope to show how the common law coach runs not on three substantive wheels, but on four.
The exercise is carried out in several stages. The first section of
this Article investigates the elusive distinction between harms inflicted
and benefits conferred, so critical to the basic divisions of the substantive law. The second section examines the linkage between the law of
restitution and the creation of positive spillover effects. The third section analyzes and compares the response to problems of necessity and
mistake as it applies in both restitution and torts. The fourth section
shows the hidden role that the restitution principle-how it accounts
for benefits conferred by the defendant-has on the articulation of
general tort principles. The fifth section indicates the critical role that
the restitution principle has in the public law. A brief conclusion
follows.
II. HARMS AND BENEFITS: THE INITIAL BASELINE
It is commonplace in modem discussion to dispute the usefulness
of any line between harm inflicted and benefit conferred and by implication the distinction between restitution and tort, between, as it were,
the harm principle and the benefit principle.9 Everything is said to
turn on the choice of the appropriate baseline by which these calculations are made. If X has a right to a full tuition scholarship to law
early categorization of the law of quasi-contract, see Arthur L. Corbin, Quasi-ContractualObli-

gations,21 YALE U. 533 (1912).
7.

WILUAM A. KEENER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTs (1893); FREDE-

C. WOODWARI), THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS (1913). The term restitution seems to
have gained popularity after the initial efforts, doubtless to disentangle the connection between
contracts (of consensual origin) and quasi-contracts, which were well understood to be
nonconsensual.
8. See, eg., GEORGE E. PALMER, RESTruTxION (1978). The leading English treatise is
LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY & GAREm JONEs, THE LAW OF REnTTTON (3d ed. 1986).
9. For my crack at the other side of the line, see Richard A. Epstein, The Harm Principle-And How it Grew (forthcoming 1995).
RIC
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school, then an award of half that amount inflicts harm for the half not
provided. The absence of a greater benefit is a harm inflicted. But if
X has no right to any scholarship aid at all, then the half tuition scholarship is just what it sounds like: a benefit conferred, albeit a benefit
smaller than one that could have been conferred. If Y leaves her land
intact so that a neighbor's land retains its support, there is a benefit
conferred if the neighbor is not entitled to a lateral support easement.
But if the easement is required by operation of law, the baseline shifts;
now, not digging out the earth no longer confers a benefit on a neighbor who can count on such support as a matter of right. The removal
of earth now counts as an infliction of harm, even without any physical
invasion.
The question of benefits and harms therefore is parasitic on the
choice of baselines. To complete the argument, the choice of baselines
is often said to be largely arbitrary. This philosophical line of argument is at odds with the unproblematic way in which most people
make judgments about whether benefits have been conferred or
harms inflicted. No one seriously argues (at least when tax dollars are
at stake) that restitution is owed to persons who confer benefits on
others by not subjecting them to criminal assaults. There are no good
citizen awards (one hopes) for not murdering during the past calendar
year. Indeed, the weakness of the fashionable arguments about the
inevitable crossover from harm to benefit lies not in the first step of
the argument, that is, the proposition that some baseline must be
established before judgments of this sort are allowed. Rather it comes
in the second stage of the argument, by insisting that the choice of
conventional baselines is largely arbitrary, or at least a function of
some political theory which is heavily freighted in favor of the status
10
quo.
To see why this last philosophical move is too pessimistic for its
own good, recall for the moment the heavy dependence of the private
law on its initial demarcation of property rights. Here the first-order
rule, while subject to refinement as in the lateral support case, is a rule
of no physical invasion of the person, land, or things of another.
Boundaries may normally not be crossed, and those who cross them
normally do so at their own risk unless they can offer some justification for their action. 1 This state of affairs seems so unremarkable
10. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. Rev. 873 (1987).
11. Doughtery v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 370-71 (1835):
[I]t is an elementary principle, that every unauthorized, and therefore unlawful entry,
into the close of another, is a trespass. From every such entry against the will of the
HeinOnline -- 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1372 1993-1994
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that it is taken for granted unless and until one starts to think about
the subject from a more systematic point of view. One notable effort
in this regard is Donald Wittman's important 1984 paper which asked
whether our basic institutions of property and tort (or regulation and
taxation) should be organized around the principle of liability for
harm or that of restitution for benefit.' 2
One of Wittman's important observations was that the single constraint-create a set of optimal incentives for trade-yields insufficient information for selecting the optimal set of legal rules. To use
his most instructive (and ludicrous) example, suppose that the opportunity cost price for an apple is $1. There are two ways that this price
can be charged to A who wishes to buy an apple "owned" (the quotation marks should be used because the conception of ownership
quickly becomes Pickwickian) by farmer B, such that A will be worse
off by $1 for each apple so purchased. The first way is too obvious to
comment on: A can buy the apples and pay B the cash. That solution
presupposes that B has property rights and can exclude A at will. But
the second is to have B pay A some sum for the apples not purchased.
That sum owed is then reduced by $1 for each apple that A decides to
purchase. Thus if the initial sum owing from B to A is $100, then
when A decides to purchase one apple he gets only $99 from B.
In a topsy-turvy world, however, the incentive effects of A's decision to purchase are, when viewed in isolation, the same as they are in
a world in which A must pay for each apple he buys. To the extent
that A is made worse off by $1 per apple purchased in each regime, his
incentive to consume at the margin is the same in both systems. So in
a zero-transaction cost world, where administrative costs just don't
matter, the two legal rules appear to have the same effect on the level
of consumption, except perhaps if there is some wealth effect, which
from a distance looks quite small.' 3
possessor, the law infers some damage; if nothing more, the treading down the grass or
the herbage, or as here, the shrubbery.
Note that the statement of law, while powerful, is incorrect insofar as it ignores the body of
privileges not based on consent for entering property, and thus understates the importance of
the restitution principle. See infra note 25 and accompanying text; supra note 4.
12. Donald Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 57
(1984). For further elaboration on the baseline question, see Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and
Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property,21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 452-62 (1992).
13. A wealth effect here refers to the differences in patterns of consumption that depend
on the wealth of the party faced with marginal choices. See RONALD H. COASE, THm FiRM, THE
MARKET, AND T'HE LAW 170-74 (1988). For the position that these differences are somewhat
more important in understanding the choice of legal rules, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1991).
HeinOnline -- 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1373 1993-1994
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Wittman then goes on to explain that administrative costs do
make a difference, and the decisive difference at that. Part of these
costs are incurred to determine that the sum B must pay A equals
$100 for apples not purchased. But how is that baseline number
determined? Perhaps we should increase or decrease it: after all B
may have 101 apples. Unfortunately, no set of institutions can ever
settle on this (or any other) number; the contrast to the ease that we
settle on the conventional baseline is stark indeed. Matters get still
more confused if additional persons are added to the system. In the
conventional world, no one confers a benefit on B from not taking her
apples. But in the topsy-turvy world, if A confers this benefit on B by
refusing to take the apples, then C and D must do the same thing: The
more productive B is with her labor, the more she owes to the entire
world. The implicit assumption that only two persons are possible
trading partners makes Wittman's second ("benefit conferred") scenario far more plausible than it is. But as B shells out cash to C through
Z, she can take some comfort that she will never be solvent. Presumably when it comes to shampoo or roof tiles, she could be paid in return
by the producers of those goods who likewise have similar obligations
to multiple persons. In fact in a society in which m individuals each
produce one distinct good (that is, a society without firms or a division
of labor), all of us could collect in m - 1 cases, only to lose it all in the
one case where we produce. The ideal strategy would be to cease production altogether so as to keep the baseline payments from others,
without having to incur any costs of production. Wittman is surely
right to say that the administrative costs of this rival system dwarf
those conceivable under the current regime, but he seems to be wrong
when he says that the incentive effects are quite the same: With multiple parties the system is sufficiently zany that it could not survive; and
if it did, one pessimistic equilibrium is that no one would produce anything-perfect equality and total starvation.
The improbable outcomes of Wittman's odd property system
have an important philosophical message that baseline skeptics should
heed. One of the most common arguments against any consequentialist or broadly utilitarian system is that it is indeterminate in its recommendation for legal rules. The effort needed to argue that in the usual
case a nontakipg is conferring a benefit on those left alone shows that
this conclusion is manifestly false on the issues that concern us mostthe delineation of property rights in transactions for ordinary goods
and services. As ever, there is a political moral here as well. It is
often said that the rich and successful are not entitled to keep their
HeinOnline -- 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1374 1993-1994
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wealth because others have contributed to their enterprise by not
destroying it. But if the basic norm is one of noninterference, then no
one should be paid for observing it, but should be taxed or punished
for violating it. Only one agnostic on baseline questions can ask
whether all persons have to pay their would-be assailants to be free of
the risk of rape or murder, a conclusion that creates endless transactional complications.
One historical example shows the point. In California and other
Western states, the last half of the nineteenth century was marked by
constant battles between the forces of open range (whereby landowners were under a duty to "fence out" cattle from their land) and closed
range (whereby cattle owners were under a duty to "fence in" their
cattle to keep them from trespassing)., 4 If the question of baselines
were of little or no consequence, the choice of rules would not matter
all that much, save for the partisan aspirations of farmers and ranchers. But the differences are not those that arise simply in a zero-sum
game. Thus Kenneth Vogel has rightly observed the radical asymmetry between the two rules. Requiring a landowner to fence out roving
cattle makes it difficult for him to buy off some ranchers in order to
preserve the land for agricultural use. 15 The alternative system allows
the landowner to permit some cattle owners to use the land without
having to open it to all simultaneously. Again the asymmetries are
consequences that they generate for an overall evaluvery large in the 16
law.
the
of
ation
The robustness of the common law baselines also shows that the
modern constitutional doubts over the harmlbenefit distinction, both
in academic and judicial work, are badly overstated.' 7 The philosophical skepticism on choice of baselines takes a particular transaction out
14. Garcia v. Sumrall, 121 P.2d 640 (Ariz. 1942).
15. See Kenneth R. Vogel, The Coase Theorem and CaliforniaAnimal Trespass Law, 16 J.
LEGAL STUD. 149 (1987).
16. Why would they ever allow an open range? The answer has to be that open range is
allowed only when the number of persons who want to devote their land to agriculture is so
small that it is cheaper to bear the risks of excessive straying, relative to the transaction costs of
allowing selective entry. It follows that open range statutes will lose popularity as population
increases, which is roughly how things move. See ROBERT C. ELLiCKSON, ORDER wrmotUT
LAw. How NEIGHB ORS SETE DispuTEs 42-45 (1991).
17. For some of the parties in this line of thought, see Frank I. Michelman, Property,Utility
and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L.
REv. 1165, 1196-1201 (1967), and see the decisions of Scalia, J. and Kennedy, J., in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). I criticized their excessive reliance on
the reasonable expectations model in Richard A. Epstein, A Tangled Web of Expectations:Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. Rv. 1369 (1993).
HeinOnline -- 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1375 1993-1994
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of its larger context, and ignores the massive difference in allocative
consequences from saying "A did not harm B" as opposed to "A conferred a benefit on B." It is therefore for good reasons that we accept
a set of boundary conditions that treats acquisition of possession as
the root of ownership and requires other individuals to purchase what
they wish. Once these baselines are established, the next question is
under what circumstances, and with what results do we allow individual conduct that violates the basic rule-"buy, don't take." Indeed,
the general law of "privilege" is intelligible precisely because it starts
with this simple common law baseline and then identifies in a cautious
way the special circumstances in which some modification is warranted."8 The common law baseline gathers its strength by being serviceable over a wide range of cases, so that matters of privilege, while
important both practically and theoretically, are kept confined and
infrequent. They are never allowed to dominate the overall system.
III. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
The decided preference for "buy, don't take" should quickly put
us in a tort frame of mind. The basic interactions of taking something
from the possession of another are policed under a rubric of "shame
on you if you take," not "thank you for not taking." But there is still
the question of how a system of restitution-one that calls for compensation for benefits conferred-fits into the overall scheme of legal
arrangements. To see how the problem arises, it is useful to ask this
question: To what extent can it be said that individual actions only
"concern" an actor, or that voluntary exchanges only concern the parties to them? For those actions that fall into either of these categories
we are saying in effect that we don't have to worry about the law of
tort, or for that matter the law of restitution. We can now have
actions that on net make either one or (by contract) more persons
better off than before. Because no one else is left either better or
worse off in consequence of what is done, the private gains to the
individual actor or to the trading partners travel effortlessly to the
bottom line. Because these private gains match up one-to-one with
social gains, the transactions that generate them should be
encouraged.

18. See infra part IV.
HeinOnline -- 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1376 1993-1994
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Yet there are no individual actions that "concern" only one
individual or the small group of individuals who has entered into voluntary arrangements. 19 Every transaction has innumerable consequences-positive and negative-with respect to the fortunes and
satisfactions both of the individual actor, the actor's trading partners,
and of many other individuals. The grand question for the legal system is how ought this endless array of internal and spillover effects be
taken into account. The first approximation to that question raises a
parallel to the issues that were of concern to Wittman: One could have
a rule that registers all gains and losses to all parties, including all
externalities from individual actions, positive or negative, on some
comprehensive utility scale, and then require the individual actor, or
group of actors to internalize all of these costs as he does his own
private costs and benefits. In principle, that procedure would require
payment to those who have lost from the exercise while allowing the
exaction of some sort of fee from those who have benefitted from it.
The class of actions that survive in this world are those for which the
gains in the actor's satisfaction, coupled with the collections from
strangers, are sufficient to fund payments to those who are left worse
off in consequence, and still leave something left over for the actor
herself. In a Coasean world of zero transaction costs, any questions of
evaluation of benefits and costs, the processing of claims, or collection
and distribution of funds, would be a trivial matter, so using this broad
definition of externality sets the perfect foundation for determining
legal entitlements.
Of course, this proposed plan of action is manifestly unworkable
as a legal program when transaction costs are both positive and substantial. In this state of affairs, it becomes necessary to allow for some
liberty of action in a world of inevitable spillovers, both positive and
negative. It cannot be that each action has to be justified to all other
persons. It is not that there is no cost in ignoring the complications of
19. One famous instance of that simplification occurs in John Stuart Mill's On Liberty,
where he puts the point as follows:
ft]he individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern
the interests of no person but himself. Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance
by other people if thought necessary by them for their own good, are the only measures
by which society can justifiably express its dislike or disapprobation of his conduct.
Secondly, that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment, if
society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in UniTARIANIsM, LmFRTY AND REPRESENTATiVE GovERNmENT 149 (Everyman's Library ed. 1971) (1859). Of course no action that anyone else protests
meets this exacting condition. Some netting process therefore is always required, even if it is
often suppressed.
HeinOnline -- 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1377 1993-1994
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private actions and behaving as though the only gains and losses that
matter are those naturally borne by the actor alone. When (net) positive spillovers are ignored, private benefits understate social benefits,
so it becomes likely that too little of the good or service will be produced, even if reputation and informal persuasion fill in part of the
gap left by a tolerant legal order. Yet when (net) negative externalities are ignored, too much of the good will be produced, even after the
same set of reputational and informal sanctions do their work. Most
importantly, in the most common cases individual actions produce
both negative and positive externalities simultaneously, so that it is
unclear whether excessive or insufficient production of the activity is
undertaken. Thus, playing a guitar in the airport corridors, building a
house on a hillside, or ringing a church bell on Sunday, may be pleasing to some and a source of offense to others, always in varying proportions with widely different intensities.2"
What then are the respective provinces of tort and restitution in a
world of abundant externalities? The law of tort seeks to identify the
class of negative externalities that should be taken explicitly into
account; the law of restitution or quasi-contract for its part is directed
toward the class of positive externalities. In each case the decision is
made against the backdrop of a presumption that the action in question is one that produces net gain for the actor, for otherwise that
action would not be undertaken by a self-interested individual. It is
also understood that most people are willing to choose actions that
promise net gains to themselves even if they impose substantial losses
on others. The connection between gain and loss was perceived at
least as early as Aristotle, who urged that the commission of many
acts involved both a benefit received by an actor and a harm inflicted
on another person. Consider one famous passage from the
Nicomachean Ethics:
For it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded
a bad man or a bad man a good one, nor whether it is a good or a
bad man that has committed adultery; the law looks only to the distinctive character of the injury, and treats the parties as equal, if one
is in the wrong and the other is being wronged, and if one inflicted
injury and the other has received it. Therefore, this kind of injustice
being an inequality, the judge tries to equalize it; for in the case also
in which one has received and the other has inflicted a wound, or
one has slain and the other has been slain, the suffering and the
20. See infra text accompanying notes 70-76.
HeinOnline -- 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1378 1993-1994
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action have been unequally distributed; but the judge tries to equalize things by means of the penalty, taking away the gain of the
assailant. For the term "gain" is applied generally to such cases,
even if it be not a term appropriate to certain cases, e.g., to the
person who inflicts a wound-and "loss" to the suffered; at all
events when the suffering has been estimated, the one is called loss
and the other gain.21

Here Aristotle tries to make it appear as though every case falls
into the easy category where the gain to the wrongdoer equals the loss
to the victim, so that restoration is easy. This model works well
enough if money received by defrauding another can be restored
(with interest). But it is clumsy in the wounding case where the
"gain" may take many forms: for example, the business advantages of
not having to skate against Nancy Kerrigan, or the simple reduction in
the cost of precautions. When gain does not equal loss, the tort
impulse makes the measure of damage equal to the loss, which ex post
is usually larger than the gain, even if the gain from lower precautions
is certain and the loss is only remote.
For all the weaknesses in Aristotle's treatment, it does set up the
theoretical unity by assessing gains and losses in tandem. It is puzzling
therefore to see that these two bodies of law are so often discussed as
though they fall into separate compartments. But a unified approach
seeks to work out the connections between them, and to use the
insights that are obtained to explain why the law of restitution, while
an indispensable part of the system, occupies a smaller part of the
private law than the law of tort.
If all the effects of a given action were confined to the actor, then
there would be little reason for the law to disentangle benefits from
harms. The person could engage in that exercise himself while choosing his course of action. The legal problem therefore is to deal with
the effects, both negative and positive, that individual actions have on
others. Here the basic question is to pick out those spillovers to which
the legal system will (at some positive cost) generate a response, and
those consequences, positive or negative, that are best left outside of
it. In essence we proceed by identifying those cases that fall at the
extremes of either easy inclusion or exclusion, and then feel our way
to the mass of cases that fall somewhere in the middle.

21. AiusroTLE, NicomccIAN Er-mcs bk. V, ch. 4 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941).
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In dealing with the law of restitution, one of the first tasks is to be
sure that the remedies afforded are part and parcel of a system capable of sensible administration of justice. One constraint is that the
class of benefits conferred (remember that the baseline case of exclusive ownership with transfer by voluntary sale is solved) for which
compensation is required must be small enough to be manageable. At
this point, the quasi-contract term is suggestive if only because the law
seeks to mimic contractual transactions where explicit voluntary
arrangements cannot at low cost provide the same relevant benefits. 2
By implication, when voluntary transactions are available, it is best
that they be given free reign. It is better that you ring my doorbell for
permission before cutting my lawn instead of cutting the lawn and
then ringing the doorbell and demanding compensation for the work
done. Even if I am out of town, the intermeddling is "officious"
because I could have well guarded against the prospect of an
untended garden by hiring a gardener on a long-term contract to take
care of matters whether I am at home or not. So "first do, and then
pay" has at best only little more attraction than the incentive schemes
that Wittman has imagined for the nonpurchase of goods from strangers. To give but one mundane example, it is a sign of social disintegration when strangers start washing your front windows when your
car is stopped at a red light, only to demand payment with the implicit
threat of damage if payment is not forthcoming. There is no exception
to the general rule here.
The question still arises, however, as to what exceptions should
be carved into this general rule that benefits may be obtained only
through voluntary transactions. Here we can take a leaf from the
account of voluntary action given by Aristotle in Book V of his
Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle's basic position is that all actions are
presumed voluntary until we can show otherwise, and that the two
major causes for revising that original estimation are actions that are
done under necessity and under mistake.23 The source of the compulsion could be natural events or the actions of other individuals; so too
with the source of mistake. But however induced, both of these conditions undermine the normal robust assumption that people ought to
be responsible for the consequences of their own acts. It is useful to
recall how these qualifications work.
22. A familiar theme, stressed in RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
133-34 (4th ed. 1992); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rights, Liability Rules,

and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
23. AassrTo=E, supra note 21, bk. III, at 964.
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COMPULSION

Compulsion (or necessity) imposes a constraint on the domain of
choice so that people who act are not free, not in the trivial sense of
having actions that are caused (for all motivated actions are caused in
some sense), but in the sense of laboring under external constraints
that alter their choices in ways that are: (1) sufficiently infrequent so
that they may be singled out, and (2) sufficiently dramatic so that the
distinction is rendered workable in practice.
It is worth noting that Aristotle's account dovetails fairly closely
with the common law. His two instances of compulsion represent the
act of a God and of a third party, both of which deny that the defendant did the act. Aristotle also recognizes that actions done in fear of
greater harm fall into a difficult category, as indeed they do at common law, most notably in the famous cases of Weaver v. Ward24 and
Smith v. Stone.-5 Thus in Gilbert v. Stone,2 6 the companion case to
Smith, the defendant entered plaintiff's land in order to escape pursuit
by a third party. The court held that he was liable for the trespass but
that the party who compelled his entry could not be sued. In cases
like this, Aristotle is uncertain as to whether liability should attach
because the action was voluntary in one sense (the product of individual volition) but involuntary in another (the product of external compulsion). He writes:
Those things, then, are thought involuntary, which take place
under compulsion or owing to ignorance; and that is compulsory of
which the moving principle is outside, being a principle in which
nothing is contributed by the person who is acting or is feeling the
passion, e.g., if he were to be carried somewhere by a wind, or by
men who had him in their power.27
Aristotle's account is quite sketchy, for it does not address the
issues of multiple causation and relative responsibility that lie at the
heart of the common law doctrine of proximate causation. Focusing
on these issues, moreover, allows us to escape Aristotle's dilemma of
treating actions done under compulsion as though they were either
fully voluntary or wholly without moral responsibility.
24. Weaver v. Ward, s0 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616) (finding that no trespass occurs if "as if
by force a man take my hand and strike another").
25. Smith v. Stone, 82 Eng. Rep. 533 (K.B. 1647) (finding that no trespass occurs if defendant is carried onto land of another).

26. 82 Eng. Rep. 539 (K.B. 1647).
27. AusroTmn, supra note 21, bk. III, at 964.
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The key to the discussion is to draw a strong distinction between
principles of absolute or ultimate responsibility on the one hand and
relative responsibility on the other. 8 When the question is one of
relative responsibility the question to be asked is only whether as
between the parties to the dispute, the edge should be given to either
the plaintiff or the defendant. The repeated application of principles
of relative responsibility establishes a strict hierarchy among all actors
who are involved in a given dispute. All that is necessary are successive comparisons in which the loser of the initial dispute then tries his
luck against some other party, under the same regime of relative
responsibility. If there are n possible parties to a dispute, then in principle, n-1 actions should establish the relevant hierarchy, such that any
person with lesser responsibility is allowed to sue any person with
greater responsibility. The question of rank ordering is critical whenever any party is insolvent, for in a system of relative responsibility,
any party with greater responsibility is liable to any party with less,
even if that party has an action over against another party with even
greater responsibility. Absolute responsibility, in contrast, only looks
at the two extremes. It assumes that all parties are solvent and present in a single litigation. Under those circumstances all the middlemen, so to speak, drop out of the picture so that the party who is
injured has one and only one action: that against the party with the
greatest responsibility.
This distinction is of greatest importance in the simple case where
A compels B to enter C's land. If the only question is relative responsibility, C can recover from B, for while C did nothing at all, B did
enter C's land. Precisely because A is not amenable to suit, the action
should be allowed. Under a system of absolute responsibility, however, C can only recover from A, and B drops out entirely given the
excuse that external compulsion supplies for his conduct. Recall now
that B is Aristotle's man who acts under compulsion, and the ambivalence that Aristotle observes becomes understandable because in a
system of relative responsibility B is responsible to C but may have an
action over against A. In a moral system, the imperfections of the real
world do not impinge on matters of accountability, so that only A is
responsible. The older common law rules that allowed suits by C
against B, but not against A, thus show the tension between the ease
of proof within a tort system and the matter of ultimate responsibility.
28.

See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 174-77

(1973).
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The true culprit escapes. Yet even that judgment is contingent on the
question of whether B could have an action for indemnity against A,
an issue on which there is, as best as I can recall, very little authority
in the early cases, but for which an action is easily allowable under the
more expansive twentieth century notions of proximate causation.29
B. MISTAKE
Mistake is also said to negate voluntary action because it leads
people to place the wrong values, positive and negative, on the choices
that they make, and hence leads them to do things that they later
regret when the true state of affairs comes to light. Just as necessity
can arise from natural events or the actions of third parties, so too
with mistake: Mistake may be the result of a simple misunderstanding
or it may be induced by mischief and fraud of other individuals. The
differences between these two cases seems reasonably clear. Where
the mistake is induced by the misrepresentation of a third party, then
one party is wholly passive and innocent, while the other party is not
passive and may have acted either negligently or fraudulently. But
the cases of joint innocent mistake remain the most difficult for both
moral and legal systems, for although the foundations for specific conduct or bargains made have been undermined, this argument is too
powerful for its good. False claims of mistake will be difficult to
counteract because the individuals who claim to have made them do
not claim to be misled by anyone. Accepting this defense, without
severe qualification, could easily undermine the security of
exchanges. 30
IV. CONVENTIONAL GROUNDS FOR RESTITUTION
A. NECESSITY

AND COMPULSION

The categories of compulsion, or necessity, and mistake have genuine explanatory power in the law of tort, where they are usually
invoked to alter the usual rule that allows the owner of property to
exclude others from the premises at will.?' In the necessity cases, the
29. For example, see Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 196 U.S. 217 (1905),
which generally denied actions for indemnity, but would allow them where the wrongs of the two
parties were not of equal degree. Note that many modem systems would excuse B entirely
because of the external compulsion.
30. For an extensive discussion of mistake of law and fact see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CoNTcrAs 677-700 (2d ed. 1990); Gos & JoNEs, supra note 8, at 87-136.
31. Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908) ("It is clear that an entry upon the land of
another may be justified by necessity.").
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better solution calls for the creation of a conditional privilege,
whereby the thing can be deliberately taken or used so long as compensation is made for the rental value of the property and the damage
so caused? 2 That approach adopts the take now, pay later approach
for these transactions. It also raises the question of whether one
should treat this as a case of restitution for benefit conferred instead
of simply as a matter of liability for harm caused.33 The point behind
this intuition is that there is no necessary correlation between the
harm caused to the property owner and the (far greater) short-term
gain that is obtained by the party using the property under conditions
of necessity. But on this point too the better answer has been that the
restitution measure creates an undeserved windfall, so that all persons
are better off with the knowledge that they can use the property of
others in times of necessity without having to forfeit a monetary sum
equal to the value that they attach to their own life or good health.34
The theory of restitution does not make good sense when the benefits
are conferred by happenstance or chance-or indeed by the decision
of the user of the property and not its owner.
It is a far different situation, with very different legal consequences, when some organized effort by one party is necessary to save
or salvage the property of others, and immediate necessity prevents
the formation of some contract between them. Here a risk-adjusted
rate of return for the activities, capped by some substantial fraction of
the property saved, becomes the legal norm.35 That result is one that
is most conspicuous in the law of salvage, where the rescuers have to
bear substantial costs to keep their fleet at the ready. Nonetheless,
the same principle seems to apply in other contexts as well, where an
immediate necessity prevents the formation of a voluntary contract
for saving of life and limb.
32. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
33. See, eg., Robert E. Keeton, ConditionalFault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARv.L. REv.
401, 411 (1959) (arguing that the benefit in Vincent conferred on the boat owner was the avoidance of loss of the boat).
34. For a discussion of the tradeoff between holdout and externality in connection with the
necessity cases, see RicHARD A. EPsmnI, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 54-58 (1993).

35. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans,and
OtherRescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 106-08 (1978);
Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts and Externalities: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J. L. &
EcoN. 553, 582-84 (1993). Note too that restitution runs against the hull so that the salvor
obtains priority over a ship's mortgagee. The rule makes it possible for the salvor to negotiate
without regard to the state of the title. Note too that the benefit is also conferred upon the first
mortgagee whose security could well be worthless at the bottom of the sea. See SAUL LEVMORE,
EXPLAINING CREDITOR PRIoRrriES (forthcoming).
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The famous case of Cotnam v. Wisdom 36 confirmed that instinct
by allowing a restitution remedy for a physician who gave surgical
treatment that did not save an unconscious man who had been mortally injured when thrown from a streetcar. Here a remedy was
allowed because there was no risk of bypassing a voluntary market,
and little risk of providing services that the victim himself would have
refused if competent to bargain. It is perhaps a somewhat closer case
as to whether the fees should be allowed only in those cases where the
services were successful and not otherwise. The advantage of conditioning payment on securing a favorable outcome is that it helps guard
against the provision of medical services in hopeless cases solely to
extract a fee from the helpless victim. Yet in ordinary fee-for-service
medicine the payment to the physician is not typically conditioned
upon the soundnees of the diagnosis or the success of the treatment.
It is paid for the rendering of services in good faith, irrespective of the
outcome. In nonconsensual settings, the risk of unwanted services is a
greater possibility, but not so powerful as to justify switching to a rule
that looks at outcomes only. Instead it seems better to monitor this
question directly within the context of a rule that allows for payment
of routine fees and thus permits survivors to refuse the fees on the
ground that there was no reasonable basis for the provision of services-an easy judgment only where the patient was certain to die no
matter what heroic measures were adopted.
Cotnam v. Wisdom is also interesting for its evaluation of the
damage remedy. Physicians' fees for services rendered are not set by
heaven, and here the plaintiff set his fee after making inquiries as to
the net worth of the decedent, with the obvious intention of acting like
a price-discriminating monopolist. The court held, rightly in my view,
that this information had to be ignored, and the reasonableness of fees
had to be determined without regard to the defendant's wealth. In so
doing it mirrored the outcome of a competitive market in which price
discrimination is not possible no matter what the absolute or relative
wealth of the purchaser.3 7 In fact, the question of overcharging for
emergency services on a spot contract is not an issue of isolated
importance, but is indeed one of major institutional importance, for
36. 104 S.W2d 164 (Ark. 1907).
37. A point that was intuitively grasped by the court in Cotnam, which quoted with
approval the following sensible passage from Robinson v. Campbell, 47 Iowa 625, 627 (1878):
"There is no more reason why this charge should be enhanced on account of the ability of the
defendants to pay than that the merchant should charge them more for a yard of cloth, or the
druggist for filling a prescription, or a laborer for a day's work."
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virtually 38all routine accidents present the same risk that was found in
Cotnam.
It is important, however, to be cautious in making generalizations. Saul Levmore addresses just this issue in an instructive comparison of two cases.39 In Leebov v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co.,40 the plaintiff was a builder who used his trucks to shore up a
construction site in order to prevent major landslide damage to
nearby properties. His trucks were destroyed in the successful operation. The value of sacrificed trucks was far smaller than the losses
averted, losses covered under policies issued by the defendant insurer.
Although the plaintiff's losses were in some sense voluntary, they
occurred in a setting dominated by necessity and the insurance company was doubtless far better off paying for the trucks than for hefty
tort damages. Necessity justifies holding the insurer liable.
Levmore's next question is whether recovery in restitution makes
sense when the maneuver fails so that both the trucks and the neighboring property are destroyed. Here we do not have the advantages
found in Cotnam v. Wisdom, namely of a consistent pattern of voluntary transactions against which to measure the reasonableness of the
behavior in this case. But if the question here is whether one can
detect any form of opportunism on the part of Leebov, or any collateral motive for doing the act, the answer appears to be no. The conduct here is exactly what the insurer would have wanted, playing the
odds. It is important not to overstate the point because unlike Cotnam, a fairly detailed insurance contract regulated the issue, 41 and it
could have stated that Leebov took this action at his own risk, just as
38. 'This problem was common in England when personal injuries were treated by physicians who were reimbursed under the poor law. Where the person injured was treated by physicians under contract with the local township, the costs incurred were small. But when someone
had the misfortune to be injured away from his home base, the charges demanded could be
inordinate. See A.W.B. Simpson, Priestly v. Fowler, 33-41 (unpublished, on file with author).
The basic rule settled upon was that treatment for the "casual poor" who were injured away
from home fell on the parish in which the injury took place. The rule had two advantages. It
offered a clear rule and it assured prompt treatment that could be otherwise denied if the local
parish sought to move the hapless victim home in order to escape the charges. Applied uniformly, the burdens equaled out, so there was a form of restitution of sorts between parishes.
39. See Saul Levmore, Obligation or Restitution for Best Efforts, 67 S. CAL. L. Ruv. 1411,
1414-15,1431-35 (1994); see also Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REv. 65 (1985)
(discussing possible explanations for restitution law and examining their descriptive power in
various situations).
40. 165 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1960).
41. On this contract-restitution overlap, see Andrew Kull, Restitution As a Remedy for
Breach of Contract,67 S. CAL- L. Ruv. 1465 (1994).
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most insurance contracts covering damage to the insured's property or
liability on it require that the insured take loss-reducing precautions
both before and after coverage is extended. Still it is a good guess that
the right answer is to treat the cost of good faith but unsuccessful
efforts to prevent the landslide as compensable under a restitution
theory.
Levmore's companion case, McNeilab v. North River Insurance
Co.,42 arose out of the Tylenol tampering cases of the early 1980s.
After Johnson & Johnson (the maker of Tylenol) learned of the first
instances of tampering, it removed all of its 'Tylenol capsules from the
market even though the Food and Drug Administration did not order
a recall. The removal campaign has been widely hailed as the master
response to a crisis situation, for it left lylenol with public praise and a
higher market share than before the incident. As an outgrowth to the
episode, however, McNeilab sought to recover its recall expenses
under its insurance policy, inviting in effect a comparison between its
case and Leebov. Levmore notes the obvious distinction between the
two cases: With Leebov the extra precaution was successful, while
with McNeilab only a few additional tablets laced with cyanide were
discovered. He then notes that in situations of this sort, it is tempting
to infer that the recall was not prompted by a fear of liability ex ante
since it did not reduce that liability ex post.
While this is surely part of the situation, several other pieces to
the puzzle have to be noted. Leebov did not present any overarching
concern with public good will or regulatory response, both of which
deal with losses that are generally outside the scope of liability coverage. In addition, there was ample time for a consultation with the
insurer before embarking on a $100 million recall campaign, and, as
Levmore notes, recall insurance is available for a separate premium,
which militates against providing for it under the standard liability
policies. The failure of the outcome and the presence of a manifest
collateral motive differentiate this case from Leebov. All in all, there
is sufficient reason to believe that the conduct undertaken by McNeilab was not conduct which ex ante was in the joint interest of both the
insurer and the insured, so that no necessity justified a finding of coverage. As with the law of tort, restitution depends on a sharp distinction between restitution for benefits conferred on strangers, and

42. 645 F. Supp. 525 (D.NJ. 1986), affd, 831 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1987).
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restitution in the context of ongoing, if incomplete, ,contractual
arrangements. 43
The entire question of whether payment in necessity cases should
be dependent on success is one that yields to no dominant solution in
cases of genuine uncertainty. In principle we could make the parties
indifferent to the choice of rule by altering the level of compensation
paid when success occurs. But there is an enormous difference
between a probability of 0.1 and 0.001; yet after the fact it is often not
possible to decide which type of long shot was brought home a winner.
In addition, if the multiple for compensation becomes too large, the
solvency constraint begins to bite. Few surgeons use contingent fees
in successful cases, and it seems unlikely that they should be adopted
here. Yet before wedding one's self to a rule that predicates a remedy
solely on the rendition of services, recall that (unlike Leebov and
McNeilab) the salvor cases are all contingent on success, but subject to
a clear upper bound of fifty percent of the cargo and hull saved. The
size of the transactions, the publicly verifiable nature of the evidence,
and the collateral motives of the intervenor all play their part in the
analysis. Yet why should we expect otherwise? In the area of voluntary contracts there is no dominant solution. Sometimes payment is
contingent on performance; often it is not. The law of restitution
could hardly achieve a uniform solution that is simpler than that
observed in voluntary arrangements directed to this very question.
B. MISTAKE
The second category of cases that falls under the rubric of restitution involves cases of mistake. Once again there is an instructive parallel to the tort side of the problem. Consider the case where the
defendant cuts and harvests the plaintiff's trees, thus committing the
wrongs of trespass and conversion." The widely known doctrine of
waiver of tort permits the plaintiff to tie recovery not to the loss suffered, but to the benefit obtained by the defendant.4' Some early
cases took the line that the tort could be waived only in the event that
the trees were sold, thereby establishing their market value.4 6 But
while resale is surely the easy case, there is no reason in theory for it
43. See Kull, supra note 41.
44. For a discussion, see OLrVER W. HoLMEs, THDE COMMON LAW 97 (1881). For the rule
that holds a converter liable when property is taken under an innocent and excusable mistake,
see Maye v. Tappan, 23 Cal. 306 (1863).
45. On which generally, see GOFF & JoN.s, supra note 8, at 605-23.
46. See, e.g., Jones v. Hoar, 22 Mass. 285 (1827).
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to be the only case. If the timber is kept or used by the plaintiff, the
gain obtained is more difficult to monetize, but nothing in the law of
unjust enrichment should preclude the plaintiff from proving those
damages if they are substantially greater than the tort recovery.
Waiver of tort is invoked to prevent the defendant from making a
profit by bypassing the tort system, where the extraction of full benefit
operates as the equivalent of injunctive forms of relief.47 Clearly, further modifications are, and should be made for those conversions
made in bad faith, where the defendant is not permitted to reduce the
amount paid by the costs of cutting and collecting the trees, that is, by
an amount equal to the benefit that his wrong conferred upon the
plaintiff who no longer needs to expend his own labor to achieve the
same result.48 The rules that are applied to mixture of goods by honest mistake, wherein each side is given compensation in proportion to
the benefits contributed to the joint enterprise, carry over without losing a beat to the instant situation. 49
Yet just as the law of necessity need not be moored to the law of
tort, so too with the law of mistake. One early mention of quasi-contract in the Roman law is in a text of Gaius which speaks of money
paid over by mistake to discharge a debt that was not owed. The
explanation given was that the action to recover the money so paid
could not be in contract, since there was no promise to return money
that had been paid in order to discharge, not create an obligation. 0
The explanation for the rule is easy to see, for if the money is not
returned, the transaction will become de facto a gift, even though the
mistake negatives any donative intent by the defendant. As with conversion, it is easy to imagine situations where the restoration remedy
is not so easy to implement. If goods delivered by mistake are converted or consumed, the appropriate remedy is the restoration of like
goods to the plaintiff, or that failing, a payment of the reasonable
price for the goods in question.
47. See, eg., Braithwaite v. Akin, 56 N.W. 133 (N.D. 1893).
48. For a discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Inducement of Breach of Contractas Problem
of Ostensible Ownership, 16 J. LEGAL STU. 1, 17-21 (1987) (noting the relationship between

conversion cases and inducement of breach of contract).
49. For the early statement of the rules, see JusTmN's INsurrrTrEs bk. II, tit. I.
50.

See Grus, INsTrrurs bk. IH, § 91:

He too who receives what is not due to him from one who pays in error comes under a
real obligation.... This sort of obligation, however, appears not to be founded on
contract, because one who gives with an intent to pay means to untie rather than to tie

a bond.
Note that the real obligation to which Gains had just referred was the contract of mutuum, that

is, a loan of goods with a promise to restore like kinds and numbers.
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RESTITUTION AND TORT

A. THE MATCHING

PRINCIPLE

Thus far I have assumed that the impulse toward restitution
manifests itself in the creation of some special remedy for a plaintiff
who has conferred some benefit upon the defendant where a voluntary transaction was not possible and a gift not intended. But not all
situations in which benefits are conferred are appropriate for the restitution remedy. Legal actions are always costly to bring, and those for
restitution may be especially complicated, particularly if the benefit
conferred upon another party takes the form of a reduction in cost
that is difficult to measure. In addition, in many cases the intention is
to make a gift of services for which no direct compensation is
expected.
Yet even when the benefit conferred does not create some direct
right of action, it may be taken into account by indirection, namely, by
exerting its influence on principles of tort liability. The prospective
rescue or assistance may go astray, and when it does the question is
whether the putative rescuer has become an unhappy tortfeasor
responsible in damages to the party that he would assist. That result
can surely occur, but even so, the tort cases appear to exhibit a clear
pattern whereby conferring a benefit, or even attempting to do so,
diminishes the anticipated liabilities of the would-be rescuer. A rescuer may not be able to recover under a theory of restitution, but will,
if sued, be able to use the benefit conferred to lower the standard of
liability used for judging his conduct under the tort law. The principle
is in fact one of fairly broad application in all cases of bodily injury or
property damage, whether in the context of strangers or contractual
parties. It is instructive to look at some of the patterns here.
The key to the analysis is the same as before: Any given action is
likely to generate a whole bundle of consequences, some negative and
some positive, some borne by the actor and some borne by others.
While the distribution of costs and benefits is not strictly determined,
the forces of individual self-interest tell us a good deal about its shape
in the ordinary case. In the absence of legal liability, most people will
arrange their affairs to internalize the benefits of their actions while
dropping any harmful consequences into the laps of others. The case
for a system of strict liability rests on the dominance of one recurrent
and pervasive matching principle: The party who seeks to obtain the
benefit of certain actions is the one who, pro tanto, should bear the
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liability for the losses that those actions cause. The great advantage of
this principle is that it spares the trier of fact the difficult after-the-fact
task of determining what level of care was appropriate in light of the
external peril and the private gain. The cost-benefit analysis of the
Hand formula provides no magic way to estimate the benefits that are
difficult to measure under the law of restitution. 51 In place of such
difficulties, the strict liability rule identifies the party whose conduct
inflicts losses on another, and forces that party to bear the losses as
though they were self-inflicted.52
B.

CONSENSUA.L CASES

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that some inflexible

law of nature requires that defendants seek to internalize all benefits
and externalize all costs. There are many situations, both contractual
and between strangers, where the distribution does not follow this
standard mode, and it is precisely in these settings that the greatest
deviations from strict liability are found. To begin with some consensual cases, the traditional categories of bailment, incorporated from
53
the Roman Law through the great decision of Coggs v. Bernard,
were heavily sensitive to the planned distribution of benefits and burdens. A priori, it may not be possible to determine where the benefits
from bailments as a class will flow. If the bailor seeks safe-keeping for
goods that the bailee is not allowed to use, the benefit runs to the
bailor. If the bailee is to use the bailor's fine china at his own tea
party, then the benefit runs to the bailee. If the bailment is to allow
the bailee to perform a task for a partnership between the two, then
the benefit is joint. The risk of loss, at least under the classic English
51. See United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Learned Hand,
J.). Commentary on the formula has been exhaustive. For its most notable early defense, see
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STD. 29 (1972).
52. Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 158 (1973)
("The action in tort in effect enables the injured party to require the defendant to treat the loss
he has inflicted on another as though it were his own."). Note that this explanation slides past
the Coasean difficulty, analyzed above, of deciding what action is a cause of what harm, and acts
as though the use of force against another person meets that standard. The issue is of little
relevance here because the same problem of causation applies whether one uses a negligence or
strict liability standard, or for that matter any other standard. See Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts,
Externalitiesand the Single Owner: One More Saluteto Ronald Coase,38 J. L. & ECON. 553,57779 (1993). For an effective criticism of my position, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Causationand Wrongdoing, 63 CHi.-KENr L. REv. 407 (1987). See also Richard A. Epstein, Causation-In Context
An Afterword, 63 C.-KmNT L. Rev. 653 (1987) (criticizing Weinrib for the belief that the negligence principle is defensible as some kind of necessary truth).
53. 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1704).
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and Roman conceptions, was responsive to these variations in benefit
and tended to trump a powerful but constant fact: the bailee was
always in possession and hence better able to avoid the risk. Instead,
the risk of loss follows the distribution of benefits: Where the bailment
was for the bailee, then the rule was strict responsibility, save for loss
caused by enemies of the Crown or vis major. When benefits were for
the bailor, the rules required good-faith efforts; when benefits were
for both, the standard was ordinary negligence. The party that
receives the greater benefit bears the greater burden-unless there is
some contractual stipulation to the contrary.
Other consensual areas may involve similar sliding scales. The
traditional distinctioh between invitee, licensee, and trespasser is one
that to some extent tracks the benefits that both sides derive from a
broad class of transactions.54 The invitee enters a commercial establishment with an eye toward mutual gain; the licensee does so at the
pleasure of his host, where hospitality dominates commercial
exchange; and the trespasser seeks to gain by his wrong against the
owner. The traditional classification on the subject moved the standard of care in lockstep with the distribution of benefits: The invitee
was owed a duty of reasonable care, including reasonable inspections;
the licensee was owed a warning about concealed traps or defects,
without any independent duty of inspection. The trespasser assumed
all risks in the premises except those which were deliberately or willfully set for his destruction. The modem impulse tends to diminish
the categorical nature of this classification, and thus tracks the similar
trend for bailment: One standard of reasonable care may be applicable to the circumstances of these different cases.55 But the shift in
standards may be somewhat less important than meets the eye, for a
successful defendant or plaintiff's attorney, as the case may be, may
always indicate how the status of the plaintiff influences the reasonableness of the care that is owed to her-a case by case recreation of
the original categories, which in many jurisdictions still retain their
original vitality.
Medical malpractice situations involve much the same considerations. The physician who operates does so for the joint benefit of both
sides. The physician benefits from payment and the patient benefits
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS §§ 328E-350 (1965). For a succinct account of
the classical distinctions between invitees, licensees, and trespassers, see Robert Addie &,Sons
(Collieries), Ltd. v. Dumbreck, 1929 App. Cas. 358.
55. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
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from services rendered. The standard of ordinary care, so dominant
in medical malpractice cases, reflects this distribution of benefits and
costs, and reflects further the inordinate difficulty of asking the plaintiff to fund ex ante payments under a strict liability rule, which is likely
to generate far greater payoffs given the intrinsic risk inherent in all
dangerous medical procedures. 56 Once again the mixed distribution
of benefits and costs leads away from the strict liability rule applicable
in the paradigmatic stranger case.
Some similar strands are found in the area of products liability,
where the sale of a product generates both benefits and risks to the
plaintiff. A product that carries with it positive risk may be a good
product nonetheless, if the risk imposed is smaller than the risk that
the plaintiff would face if forced to use some riskier alternative. That
mixture of benefits and losses has led most modern courts to abandon
strict liability rules in favor of some intermediate standard of care,
usually couched in cost-benefit if not negligence language. I think
that there is much to be said against the undifferentiated cost-benefit
standards so dominant in these contexts, and have elsewhere
defended the more extensive use of a customary standard against the
more ad hoc balancing tests. 57 But for these purposes the critical
point is that the element of implicit benefit to the.product user is what
again drives the courts away from a strict liability standard, as the general thesis predicts.
Even here, however, it is critical not to be too dogmatic about the
overall outcome, for construction defect cases are often governed by
strict liability rules instead of say, a rule that places the burden of
proof for negligence on the defendant.5 8 But these all present defendants with a relatively easy choice: Greater inspection produces fewer
defects, an option that is just not available in the design defect type of
56. Strict liability rules for medical malpractice have been occasionally suggested. See
Clark v. Gibbons, 426 P.2d 525,539 (Cal. 1967) (Tobriner, J.). But when the proposal has been
put into action, even on a limited scale, it has usually been condemned. See, e.g., Helling v.
Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1964), overturned by statute, WAsH. REv. CODE § 4.24.290. See generally Jerry Wiley, The Impact of Judicial Decisions on Professional Conducea An Empirical
Study, 55 S. CAL- L. REv. 345 (1981) (attempting to measure the effect of Helling). Likewise
there is an enormous reluctance to infer any contract for cure in this setting. See Sullivan v.
O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 186 (Mass. 1973) (Kaplan, J.). The rejection of strict liability under
contract goes a long way toward explaining why the principle was never adopted under the
ostensible tort substitutes.
57. Richard A. Epstein, The Pathto The TJ. Hooper: The Theory and Historyof Custom in
the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STu. 1 (1992); see also Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/
Utility, 48 OHIo ST. LJ. 469 (1987).
58. See REs-TATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965).
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case, where any mistakes infect the entire product line. With this said,
the ease of the strict liability standard in construction defect cases
probably redounds to the benefit of the defendant who adopts it: The
greater the security against defects of this sort, the higher the price
that can be commanded. Most manufacturers want to have strict warranties on such matter as purity and contamination. The opposite
standard creates a marketing disaster (think again of Tylenol) that is
far greater than the tiny liabilities for breach of warranty.
Yet the dynamics assume a wholly different form when the question concerns liability for prescription drugs. To be sure, if these drugs
are not chemically prepared in the proper fashion, a strict liability rule
should (presumptively) continue to apply for this variation of a construction defect. But where a drug properly prepared has certain necessary and unavoidable side effects, very different concerns apply. A
moment's reflection indicates that it would be suicidal to adopt the
same rule that applies to construction defects, namely, one that holds
the manufacturer responsible for all side-effects of the product. Very
many drug situations require a response to the hand nature and disease have dealt. To get rid of the disease and its pain is not simply a
matter of time, will, and money. The patient must also be prepared to
substitute in new, and lesser, pains for the greater or more dangerous
pains that are eliminated. No one receives tort compensation from
the manufacturer for the pain and suffering of the underlying disease
that prompted payment in the first place. Why then would anyone
seek to gain compensation from drugs that on net reduce the amount
of pain and suffering sustained? To require the payment of damages
under these circumstances is in effect to charge back a very large portion of the natural calamities of mankind to the agents that have
reduced their impact.
Clearly a better way is needed, and it is found in the general rule
that starts with the proposition that all known side effects are the risk
of the patient not the manufacturer. But what of those side effects
that are not known to the patient? Here there are two cases: In the
first these side effects are known to the manufacturer, and their presence could easily influence the decision on whether to use this drug, or
what dosage to use. The basic rule therefore requires that this information be transmitted to the physician or patient and backs up that
rule with a set of federal requirements as to which warnings should be
given to what individuals. Where those warnings are conveyed, and
are regarded as sufficient, there is no need to figure out "what might
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have been" when drugs were used when inadequate or no warnings

were given. And in my own view, the Food and Drug Administration
warnings should be regarded as conclusive on the question of liability,
for there is no effective rule of cost-benefit accounting that allows the
warning to be reengineered after that fact in the context of a heated
jury trial.
The second branch of the inquiry is what happens when the risks

and side-effects are unknown and unknowable under the available
research protocols. A strict liability theory points to the imposition of

risk of loss on the manufacturer, but the matching principle of benefits
and harms tends to run in quite the opposite direction. The patient

gets (without additional cost) any benefit that makes a drug more
effective than one thought at the time of sale, and thus the patient
bears the risks of these side effects as part of the price for obtaining
the drug in question. The point is well in comment k to section 402A,

which leaves the risk on the product user.59 The occasional case that
proposed strict liability for the side effects of drugs and vaccines ran
into a blizzard of opposition, and the proposed Restatement (Third) of
Torts vastly expands the proposed scope of the rules governing prescription drugs, but does not deviate from the basic plan of opera-

tion.6° So once again the matching principle gravitates to a rule of
negligence, which imposes the residual risk of harm on the plaintiff.
The technology of the drug cases is far more complex than that of the
old fashioned bailment cases, but the underlying legal principles are

the same.

§ 402A cmt. k:
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state
of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to
very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself
invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are
fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve.
Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning,
is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other
drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold
except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician.
60. See RETATE MNT (TmiRD) OF TORTS § 8. The most regrettable feature of the entire
Restatement approach is its steadfast refusal to consider or allow contractual solutions, which
could fine tune the answer to liability questions far more accurately than the positive law. It is
useful to have a keen awareness of some of the element that lead to the right solution on liability
questions, but better by far to privatize the entire issue-not the intellectual trend of the '90s.
59.

REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
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C. STRANGER CASES
The consensual cases, then, show a genuine willingness to calibrate the defendant's duty to his anticipated level of gain. In principle, there is no reason for the rules in stranger cases to necessarily ape
the default rules adopted in consensual situations. But by the same
token there is little reason for the rules in stranger cases to deviate
from them either. The stranger case is characterized by the lack of
any direct interaction between the soon-to-be plaintiff and the soonto-be defendant before the infliction of harm. These cases therefore
are, almost by definition, high-transaction-cost cases. If the default
rules in consensual situations afford some information as to how persons act in low-transaction-cost settings, then why not follow their
lead unless and until some good lead suggests a deviation? The effort
therefore to tailor the losses to match the implicit distribution of benefits can be applied here, and in many practical situations it is.
Yet there are clear exceptions to a general rule, of which the rescue cases, which figure so prominently in the law of restitution generally, are perhaps the most prominent. These cases typically arise in
contexts of necessity, where the identity of the rescued beneficiary has
a good deal to do with the level of care to which the defendant is held.
Thus in the standard case of private necessity, a defendant avails herself of the plaintiff's property in order to save herself. The situation is
more ,dramatic than the usual case of private gain and external loss,
chiefly because no one wants to second-guess the defendant's basic
decision, that is, no one wishes to enjoin the self-rescue that has taken
place. But the ability of one party to force herself upon her neighbor
only reinforces the basic instinct behind strict liability: The defendant's interest here is not merely to reduce her own cost at the risk of
some harm to a neighbor. It is to take the neighbor's property and to
use or destroy it for her own benefit. Right though the decision may
be, it is right as well to adhere to the original strict liability standard,
which is probably the dominant standard in cases of this sort.
Yet the strict liability standard starts to give way with change in
the distribution of benefits from rescue. Thus where a defendant
seeks to rescue plaintiffs property from near certain destruction, the
right response (although one not always followed in the early cases) 61
is to reduce the standard of care for the defendant to one of good
61. See, e.g., The Tithe Case, Y.B. 21 Hen. 7, fol. 26, 27, 28, pl. 5 (1506). This case is
discussed at length in Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalitiesand the Single Owner: Another
Tribute to Ronald Coase, 36 J. L. & EcoN. 553, 579-81 (1993).
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faith, to induce the effort to rescue in the first place. Unlike the classical situation of private necessity just discussed above, self-interest will
impel potential rescuers to stay away from danger unless protected
from the additional risk of liability. The lower standard of care, usually one that requires only conduct in good faith, protects against just
that risk. Hence the strong emergency exception to the usual rules on
battery allows virtually any good-faith contact. 62
A similar situation is covered by the doctrine of public necessity,
that is, where the defendant acts for the benefit of some third party.63
Here again a stringent doctrine of liability creates the private incentive to shy away from some socially beneficial act, 4 while the lower
standard of good-faith liability (which still protects others against
malicious behavior) increases the likelihood of favorable intervention
in the first place.65 The reduction of the standard of tort liability still
leaves an imbalance in the system: Plaintiff now suffers a loss while
third persons have benefitted, but a better remedy is a direct action
for restitution against the persons who received a benefit scarcely
intended as a gift by its passive maker. And whether such action lies
depends less on the power of the theory and more on its administrative complications. It is surely possible, on a sound restitution theory,
to impose a special assessment on persons whose property has been
spared to cover pro rata the losses of those Whose property has been
sacrificed. By way of example, the entire institution of general average contribution, of such importance in the admiralty context, serves
as a response to the perils of the sea. The costs of jettisoning some
cargo overboard are to be borne proportionately by all who benefit
(owner of the hull included).66 Superior incentives are created when
benefits and losses are brought into alignment by the operation of the
legal rule.

62. Kennedy v. Parrott, 90 S.E.2d 754 (N.C. 1956).
63.

See, eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 196, 262; see also United States v.

Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (upholding destruction of oil refineries about to be captured by the
Japanese in World War II against a taking clause challenge).
64. The most famous illustration is still the refusal of the Mayor of London to order the
tearing down of the Inns of Court for fear of liability, in consequence of which half the city was
burned. See Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357, 363 (Pa. 1788).
65. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (recognizing qualified immunity for Ohio
governor Rhodes in Kent State University killings).
66. For a discussion, see Epstein, supra note 61, at 582-84; William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans,and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law
and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978).
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Still other situations involve a somewhat more concealed operation of the benefit principle. One nice illustration of the point is
Brown v. Kendall, in which Chief Justice Shaw opts strongly for the
negligence principle. 67 The standard reading of Brown treats the case
as one of general application-the level of care is to be proportionate
to the perceived peril, as the theory of negligence would have it.68 At

this most general level, Shaw is guilty of the charge that he addresses
the wrong question. To be sure, a hunter should take far greater care
in shooting in a crowded city than in an open marsh, but the decisive
legal question lies not in setting the standard of care, but in deciding
who should bear the residual risks that remain when reasonable care,
however defined, is taken. The mere fact that this risk shrinks as one
moves from city to country scarcely affords a decisive reason for shifting that (smaller) risk from defendant to plaintiff.
Yet anchored more closely to its facts, the outcome in Brown v.
Kendall rests on firmer foundations than this general critique of the
negligence principle suggests. The defendant was breaking up a fight
between two dogs, one owned by him and one owned by the plaintiff-a necessity of sorts. The plaintiff was looking on, saw the risk,
and did not get out of the way of the moving stick that took out his
eye. One line of defense therefore is a cross between assumption of
risk and contributory negligence, which would not be available (at
least under a strict liability system) if the plaintiff had been a total
stranger to the situation. 69 But another goes more directly to the stan-

dard of care imposed on a defendant whose actions are undertaken
(as in the ordinary bailment case) for both sides. Defendant, if successful in the rescue, might not be able to charge the plaintiff something for his exertions, but he can receive compensation in the indirect
way mentioned earlier: by moving down from strict liability to negligence, not because of a general liability rule, but in response to the
joint benefits generated by his actions.
67. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
68. "A Man, who should have occasion to discharge a gun, on an open and extensive
marsh, or in a forest, would be required to use less circumspection and care, than if he were to
do the same thing in an inhabited town, village, or city." Id. at 296.
69. See The Thorns Case, Y.B. 6 Edw. 4, fol. 7, pl. 18 (1466):
So, too, if a man makes an assault upon me and I cannot avoid him, and in my own
defence I raise my stick to strike him, and a man is behind me and in raising my stick I
wound him, in this case he shall have an action against me, and yet the raising of my
stick to defend myself was lawful and I wounded him me invito.
(Brian, counsel for plaintiff.) The Restatement, following the negligence orthodoxy takes the
opposite line, and finds liability "only if the actor realizes or should realize that his act creates an
unreasonable risk of causing such harm." REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 75.
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The power of the joint benefit point is apparent also in cases that
start with the strict liability principle. Thus the "true rule" in Rylands
v. Fletcher is
that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and
collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes,
must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of
its escape.70
In this context, the critical phrase of Blackburn's familiar incantation are the words "for his own purposes." The strict liability rule is
confined to cases where the defendant seeks to obtain all the benefits
from filling the reservoir, leaving others at risk for the harms from
flooding. The clear negative implication of Blackburn's proposition is
that the strict liability rule is relaxed when it no longer offers the ideal
match of benefits to burdens. The proof of this particular pudding
came quickly with Carstairsv. Taylor,7 a case where rats ate through
gutters that the defendant installed in his building for his own benefit
and that of the plaintiff tenant. The presence of the mutual benefit
was held to take the case out of the rule in Rylands and to lead to the
adoption of some negligence standard in its stead.
The distribution of benefits and harms is also critical to the law of
nuisance. Nuisances are difficult to bring within the framework of a
single liability rule because they come in so many sizes and shapes.72
In the simplest case, the defendant operates a factory or mill that
spews forth waste and filth that causes harm to a neighbor. Where
that single source of pollution causes substantial levels of external
harm, the matching principle holds that the defendant should be
strictly liable for the harm that ensues, even if no injunction is granted
against the injuries in question. The case is little different from one in
which the defendant shoots or strikes a hapless plaintiff. But as the
cases become more complex, the distribution of benefits and burdens
shift, rendering the strict liability principle far less attractive.
In other nuisance cases, the benefit principle has a more subtle,
almost underground, operation. One of the great problems of many
nuisance-like activities is that they generate both external harms and
70. Fletcher v. Rylands, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265, 279 (1866) (Blackburn, J.), aff'd, 3 L.R.-H.L. 330

(1868).
71. 6 L.R.-Ex. 217 (1871).
72. For a good overall summary of the area, see Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d

682, 688-90 (N.C. 1953).
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external benefits. Thus, to revert to an earlier illustration, the playing
of church bells may create genuine disturbance to those within close
range, while at the same time providing nice music or background
atmosphere to those located some distance away. In principle, distance from the bells works as a rough proxy for the harm or the benefit that their ringing creates: quite close, the harm dominates; at middistance, the benefits dominate; at the remote distance, no one can
hear the bells at all. The question is what system of liability will generate the greatest level of net benefits from its operation, summed
over all persons. One possible approach, which is convenient only in a
zero-transaction-cost world, is to tax all persons who enjoy the bells
and use the funds so collected to pay benefits to the parties at close
distance who are forced to endure the din. If the funds collected are
enough to compensate the losers, and leave the church satisfied with
its position, then ringing the bell may be said to make sense from a
social point of view because the compensation system in place leaves
someone better off, and no one worse off, than before. Indeed, it is
not strictly necessary that the church take in more money than it pays
out. Even if it takes in less, it may be willing to pay the difference if
that cost is lower than the benefits which it enjoys. The costless system of collection and transfers overcomes any distributional objection
to the bellringing.
Yet the manifest difficulty with this scheme of assessment and
payments is that the church has no effective method to collect its
reward for the benefit that its bellringing confers. Doctrinally, the
objection is that the church transfers no specific property to the fortunate souls who enjoy the church bells at a distance. With that the
obvious peg for restitution is knocked out from under, 73 so that what

73. REsTATEMEmr OF REsTrrmON ch. 7, at 522. "[Restitution] implies both a loss by him
and a receipt of sometiing by another" where that something is usually a receipt of property. As
an illustration of this restrictive condition, see Phillips v. Homfray, 24 Ch. 439 (1883). There
defendant mined some of plaintiff's minerals and used an abandoned wayleave beneath plaintiff's land for shipping his own ore. The court held that restitution was allowed for the minerals
taken, but that the action for the use of the wayleave did not descend on the owner's death
because it constituted only a savings of expenses and not the conferring of a discrete thing. The
economic logic here assumes that eliminating a liability should be treated differently from receiving a benefit, although the beneficiary under a will is indifferent between these two modes of
enrichment. The efficiency of the common law, as a positive matter, is not evident from the
decision. For criticism of Lord Bowen and a defense of the dissent by Baggallay, Li., see GoFF
& JONES, supra note 8, at 608-14: "If it can be shown that the tortfeasor has gained a benefit and
that benefit would not have been gained but for the tort, he should, in our view, be required to
make restitution, however the tort'is characterized." Id at 613.
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remains are diffuse but real benefits that are hard to value and impossible to collect, at least at reasonable cost. Alas, the church creates
some positive externalities for which it must go uncompensated. The
issue then is what should be done on the negative side of the line for
those inconvenienced by the din. One impulse is just to say "tough"
to the church: Its failure to collect from one group is its own problem,
so it must pay for the losses to others even though it cannot capture
their gains. But that approach has difficulties of its own: The losses
themselves could be small relative to the costs of collection, and in the
aggregate small relative to the gains that the church bells generate to
others. Putting negatives on the church's liability ledger but ignoring
the positives creates a divergence between the overall social benefit
and the losses recorded on the church's private ledger. One secondbest solution accordingly denies the church's obligation to compensate
the losers precisely because it in turn cannot collect its compensation
from the winners.
Yet that solution too has limitations of its own, which loom ever
larger as the uncompensated losses increase. It is perhaps for this reason that one well-known opinion on the issue, Rodgers v. Elliot,74
splits the difference and ties compensation to the size of the loss,
"determined by the effect of noise upon people generally, and not
upon those, on the one hand, who are peculiarly susceptible to it, or
those, on the other, who by long experience have learned to endure it
without inconvenience." 75 The upshot was that a plaintiff who was
recovering from a serious case of sunstroke in his nearby house could
not recover from the church manager for ringing the bell in his customary fashion, even after the manager received a warning from the
plaintiff's doctor as to the anticipated severity of the loss. In essence,
the boundary lines for property had shifted, as if by prescriptive right,
so that the customary sounds of the bells were no longer an actionable
invasion, given that they had long been tolerated in the community, by
among others the plaintiff himself.
The case here causes some conceptual difficulty if this particular
injury is taken in isolation from its larger context, for normally the
extrasensitive condition of the plaintiff affords a defendant no
defense. You take your victim as you find him 6 But that usual case
74. 15 N.E. 768 (Mass. 1888).
75. Id. at 771.
76. See, e.g., Smith v. Brian Leech & Co., 2 Q.B. 405 (1962); and that old standby, Vosburg
v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891).
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is not decided against the widespread distribution of benefits and burdens that are found when church bells ring. So long as there is some
belief that the customary patterns produce a net benefit on aggregate,
then individual damage actions cannot be allowed to set the balance
astray. The right response lies in other directions. One prospect is for
compensation to be supplied by other means: A reduction in local real
estate taxes is a convenient mechanism for achieving that result, with
the shortfall picked up by those who benefit, assuming of course that a
unified taxing district exists. Once the expectations are set, the harm
is minimized when individuals sort themselves by location: Persons
sensitive to noise move furthest from the church; persons who are not
move closer. When mass phenomena are involved, each person cannot act as though there were no counterweight to any autonomy
claim. No one can demand pure air and choose to live in Los Angeles.
Rodgers has the right approach once benefits and burdens are simultaneously taken into account.
The shadow role of the benefit principle is relevant in other nuisance contexts as well, where again the choice of legal role is dependent on the magnitude and frequency of certain types of harms. The
"live and let live" doctrine applies to situations where many small nuisances take place simultaneously. 77 In each case there is good reason
to believe that the benefit from the nuisance is greater than the harm
it causes: Most people would tolerate a little noise if the alternative
would be to remain absolutely silent. Because these nuisances are
widespread, the distribution of benefits and harms shifts dramatically,
at least when a market basket of these actions is considered together.
Now the benefits created will dominate the harms inflicted, both in
the aggregate and, to a high probability, for each person. It is as
though therefore each person is compensated for the harm inflicted by
the like power to inflict harms on others, so that the benefits generated obviate the need for any cash compensation, and lead to a position in which the rigors of a strict liability rule are displaced, not by
some rule of negligence, but by a total privilege to engage in these acts
short of malice. Reciprocal negative easements of support follow the
same principle. The harms inflicted by restricting the ordinary use of
property are more than offset by the gains obtained when others are
subject to parallel limitations on their own use. Here the benefits
match costs without any form of legal intervention, so that gains and

77. Bamford v. Tarnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 32-33 (Ex. 1862).
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losses are allowed to remain where they lie, but only so long as malice
is not part of the overall picture.
Vi. THE PUBLIC FACE OF THE BENEFIT PRINCIPLE
In this section I want briefly to complete the sketch of the scope
of the benefit principle by noting its critical role in public and constitutional law contexts. The intention here is to be impressionistic, not
systematic. My goal is to note how and why the restitution principle
comes to the fore in discussions of political theory.
One great movement in politics might be described as reductionist. Is it possible to explain theories of political obligation by resort to
only three wheels of the common law coach-property, contract, and
tort. The basic goal of this reductionist program is to avoid the charge
that something special is afoot in political theory by showing that ordinary conceptions of obligation usable in private contexts allow one to
account for the power that the state has over its citizen and the obligation of the citizen to obey the state. The effort to find the source of
political obligation in consent (immortalized in the Declaration of
Independence)-that our leaders rule only with the consent of the
governed-represents one such effort. The appeal first to express
consent, then to tacit consent or implied consent, simply substitutes
assertion for theory, and fiction for description. The consent that one
demands and finds in ordinary contracts cannot justify the powers of
coercion that the state exerts over its individual members.
More generally, the nub of the issue is that the grounds for political obligation-what does a citizen owe to the state-cannot be satisfactorily explicated solely by resort to principles of property, contract,
and tort. Private property explains how individual things can be
reduced to private ownership. Contract explains how labor and property may be exchanged. Tort protects labor, property, and the
exchange relationship from interference by others. Yet so ubiquitous
an institution as taxation, in any of its protean forms, cannot be
accounted for by property, contract, and tort standing alone, or indeed
by all three taken together. Repeated efforts to talk about "social
contracts" as though they were a simple generalization of ordinary
contracts for selling property or hiring labor fail. No one believes that
the requisite consent from so many disparate people, past, present,
and future could be, or has been, acquired. The social contract, it has
been said, is not worth the paper it is not written on, and modern
efforts to work out that theory have all emphasized the hypothetical
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nature of the consent which drives the underlying transaction.78 But
just because the obvious theories fall short, can we reject all forms of
taxation, or must we expand our repertoire of tools to determine
which forms of taxation are legitimate and which are not?
For most people the answer is no: political obligation there must
be-strong enough to account for a state and its power to tax, but not
so strong as to leave nothing to individual discretion and control.
With that conclusion reached, the question is how to build down
toward the foundations. The decisive building block of the system is
the theory of restitution for benefits conferred. The state provides
benefits to the individuals within its jurisdiction and meets its own
payroll by collecting taxes from the parties who are so benefitted. It is
allowed to force the exchanges because voluntary exchange cannot
yield the desired outcomes so long as anyone and everyone is allowed
to hold out for more than a proportionate share of the gain from
social organization. The necessity here is not that of a raging storm or
an impending car crash. It stems from the massive desire to obtain
social improvements that benefit all, but which cannot be reached by
voluntary exchange. Over and over again political writers such as
Locke and Blackstone point to necessity as the foundation of property
and hence of the political institutions organized to defend property.79
They do so in ways that strengthen the stark opposition between
necessity and consent by insisting that the presence of the former renders the latter unnecessary. When they speak of necessity, they

78. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUsnCE (1971) for the most notable exercise in moder contractarian theory; see also JAMES BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY (1975).
79.

JoHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT § 28:

And will anyone say, he had no right to those acorns or apples, he thus appropriated, because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his? Was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belong to all in common? If such a consent as that
was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him. We
seen in commons, which remain so by compact, that it is the taking any part of what is
common, and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in, which begins the property;
without which the common is of no use. And the taking of this or that part, which does
not depend on the express consent of all the commoners.

Note the tension: consent is not the basis of the right of property, although it is the basis of the
political obligations. What Locke lacked was a systematic appreciation of the scope and role of
the restitution principle when coordination problems were acute, as is the case when the consent
of all the commoners is required for any of them to eat.
Blackstone took more or less the same line. "Necessity begat property, and, in order to
insure that property, recourse was had to civil society, which brought along with it a long train of
inseparable commitments; states, governments, laws, punishments, and the public exercise of
religious duties." 2 WILLIAM BLACKSONE, COMMENTARIES *8
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anchor their own theories to the benefit principle of the law of restitution: The state may recover the costs of conferring benefits on its citizens by using the coercive power of taxation. Hence the benefit
conferred by political bodies becomes the basis for citizen obligations
of allegiance and support.
Nor is there any reason to be surprised that the idea of restitution
assumes so extensive a role in political discourse. Under the private
law, the principles of restitution reach their maximum power in circumstances where voluntary transactions do not function well: Cases
of necessity and mistake set the stage for invoking the principle. In
the public context necessity does not relate to the need in two-person
situations to violate exclusive rights in order to stave off imminent
peril. Rather, it stems from the stalemate that can easily emerge with
time when cooperative efforts of huge numbers of persons are necessary to make the state go. While competitive markets can function
well when only a small fraction of the total community participates,
the political order requires unanimous participation of all lest the violence of even one person undercut the stability of expectations that is
the hallmark of both 'private property and sound government.
Although the source of the necessity may differ, the legal response to
it is the same: The principle of compensation for benefits conferred
takes over where the principle of voluntary exchange leaves off.
It is one thing to state this familiar theory and another to make
sure that it operates in the most effective manner possible. The critical question often depends on the identification of before and after,
which returns us to the baseline problem with which this Article
began. One possible approach is to ask whether the individual is better off with the state than he was without it, no matter what is done
after the creation of the state. So if the state of nature carries with it
serious inconveniences, the movement to a political order could well
improve the welfare of all individuals from-to pick numbers-a prestate figure of one to a post-state figure of ten. At the second stage it
passes a statute that reduces the welfare of one group from ten to five
while advancing that of another, a bare majority, to twelve. This second maneuver is not problematic for the winners, but it raises a serious issue for anyone concerned with the overall social picture, given
that total losses outweigh total gains.
Is that second action legitimate under a theory of restitution? If
the state of nature is the baseline, then the losers at round two cannot
complain because they are still better off than they were in the state of
HeinOnline -- 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1405 1993-1994
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nature: five is greater than one, even if it is less than ten. With that
said, the level of political discretion is enormous, for no matter what
shifts in fortune are brought on by state action, all its movements are
legitimate until the level of protection that any person or group
receives falls below the level of security they could obtain unilaterally
in a state of nature. Locke himself was aware of this extreme risk and
reserved the right of revolution precisely to forestall that contingency. 80 But his solution does not address the problem at hand, for
the right of revolution would not, and could not be exercised when
state power moves an individual from ten to five: who would give up
four more units of welfare to protest the five that have already been
lost? Clearly, far better social results will be obtained if the gains
from the first maneuver could never be used as a setoff to the losses
that are subsequently imposed by government action. What additional protections should be added to the mix?
The question is how to make sure that shifts of this sort do not
take place, without relying on a remedy so drastic that like poison gas
or nuclear weapons, it will rarely if ever be used. The trick here is to
find a way to ensure that for each government action, taken separately,
there is reason to believe that state coercion provides each citizen with
equal or greater benefits than the burdens imposed. The restitution
principle has to apply to each action, not just to the total program. On
this view, once the state moves one group from one to ten by the
formation of the political order, ten now becomes the new baseline
against which further state actions are measured. Improvements from
the state of nature become vested as a matter of private right: They
establish a new baseline against which further action is measured. On
that view this second tax could not be passed, although other taxes
with greater net gain and even distribution could be passed. 1
From this it is possible to see how a powerful theory of takings
with just compensation-a strong restitution theory-becomes the
centerpiece of any sound system of political order.' The first move in

80. See LocKE, supra note 79, ch. 19, § 222 (treating the dissolution of government as the
sole remedy for a breach of trust by the legislature or the executive). No mention is made of
remedies that stop particular acts of oppression without overturning the government altogether.
81. Thus if the winners benefitted from an expenditure by more than the losers lost, the
program could go forward with a transfer payment. For a discussion of taxation and the maximization of surplus, see RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING wrr THE STATE ch. 9 (1993).
82. For my fuller defense, see RMcHARD A. EPsTmN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
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the game is to recognize that all variations in the bundle of rights associated with property, whether for one individual or many, yield some
net benefit that justifies the use of public force. Where the legislation
itself provides some benefit in kind, no additional compensation is
necessary for those persons who might claim themselves aggrieved.
Once the state is formed the holdout problem is not allowed to shipwreck additional maneuvers that promise some overall advantage.
But often state initiatives will have profound disparate impact, and
where that happens cash compensation becomes the benefit conferred
on the individual to justify the imposition of state power. In principle,
the way in which costs and benefits are netted out is critical to the
operation of the successful system, but the public law need only follow
the procedures that were used and applied in dealing with the complicated nuisance cases in which large numbers of persons were both
benefitted and harmed by a common practice.
Stated most simply, the drill undertaken with church bells in Rodgers v. Elliot is just a precursor of the identical problems that arise
when roads and highways are built and must be funded by either general taxes or special assessments. Yet in some cases, compensation for
the land taken need not be made in cash, because the enormous
increase in value (through access to markets) of the lands retained by
the original owner afford compensation in kind. In principle one
would like to impose the taxes and payments in ways that equalized
the gain to the affected individuals in proportion to their contribution,
but often the measurement problems require the use of crude proxies
(assessments of front footage) to reach second-best solutions. 83 But
no matter what is done, and how it is done-tasks that take us too far
afield here-one point should become clear. The principles of restitution are a two-edged sword. No theory of the state can do without
them, but by the same token no sound theory can go beyond them.
Bluntly stated, no theory of limited government is viable unless it
incorporates at its heart a theory of restitution: The government must
confer some benefit of equal or greater value on the parties against
whom it seeks to exercise its coercive force.
Indeed we can go further: It seems clear that one can trace the
decline of the modem theory of taxation to the severance of its
linkage to the private law theories of restitution. The connection is
evident in nineteenth century thought, as when Thomas Cooley
83.

Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfigurationof Benefit Taxation: Special Assess-

ments in Nineteenth Century America, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 201 (1983).
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summed up the issue in a single sentence: "Taxation is the equivalent
for the protection which the government affords to the person and
property of its citizens; and as all alike are protected, so all alike
should bear the burden, in proportion to the interests secured." 84 So
simple, so smart. Cooley conceives of each person as having rights
relative to the government, and his insistence that the burden be proportional to the interest secured is an effort to constrain discretion in
the imposition of government burdens. Cooley's view allows for no
social or common good independent of the interests of groups and
individuals in society, and his principle of lockstep advancement
ensures that the social power of taxation cannot be used to advance
the welfare of some but prejudice others, as in the second tax example
above.
Yet the modem view of the benefit principle erodes it from
within. Thus Justice Harlan Stone writing a half-century later misses
the major risk while making one of the most chilling assertions of
modem constitutional law:
The only benefit to which the taxpayer is constitutionally entitled is
that derived from his enjoyment of the privileges of living in an
organized society, established and safeguarded by the devotion of
taxes to public purposes. Any other view would preclude the levying of taxes except as they are used to compensate for the burden
on those who pay them, and would involve the abandonment of the
most fundamental principle of government-that it exists primarily

to provide for the common good.85

Stone's version of the benefit principle mistakenly holds that the
only baseline that matters is the state of nature, so that the losses created by the second enactment are fully set off by the gains received on
the organization of society: In his world it is possible, to drive people
from ten to five, or even to two, so long as they are not driven below
one. His reference to the advance of the "common good" obviates the
need to determine the welfare of society by looking at the welfare of
all of its members, one at a time, and summing over all persons. This
point was well understood by Cooley, who spoke of society as a collection of individual citizens, not as some entity'that floats above humankind. For Stone, losers are not allowed to protest unless they are
willing to exit society altogether, which they will not so long as the
state of nature (or migration elsewhere) is fraught with perils. The
84.
85.

613 (5th ed. 1883).
Carmichael v. South Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495,522-23 (1937) (citation omitted).
THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

HeinOnline -- 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1408 1993-1994

1994]

THE BENEFIT PRINCIPLE

1409

expansion of government power consequent on the adoption of
Stone's view is enormous, for the benefit principle that lies at the
heart of a theory of restitution is corrupted from within rather than
repudiated from without. It follows once again that the failure to
incorporate or understand the benefit principle has its largest payoff
in the public law, where the principle should be given great scope and
yet lies in neglect. There is simply no shortcut that allows the evaluation of the social worth of any legal rule or government action apart
from the consequences that it has on the population as a whole. And
the strongest confirmation of the secure place of restitution in the private law is its indispensable place in any sound theory of public law.
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